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God has, by way of his Church, by way of the Holy Father, looked after his faithful people; spoke on their behalf, directly intervened in history, in the struggle, warring together with his people for their liberation. God returned to the entire mass media, political, social and state life of Croatia, from where He was driven out forty-five years earlier. The cross of Christ stands next to the Croatian flag, Croatian bishop next to Croatian minister of state. Present at masses in churches are officers and Croatian soldiers. Guardsmen wear rosaries around their necks. This was truly again a real war for the honored cross and golden liberty, for the return of Christ and liberty to Croatia; here was not a battle for a piece of Croatian or Serbian land but a war between good and evil, Christianity and Communism, culture and barbarity, civilization and primitivism, democracy and dictatorship, love and hatred. Thank God, it all ended well, due to the Pope and Croatian politics.
Under Cardinal Franjo Kuharic, the Church further unified its policy with that of the HDZ. For example, the Church supported the exclusive usage of the Croatian language rather than Serbo-Croatian. Upon unseating the Communist Party of Croatia, Tudjman decreed the immediate removal of all signs in the Cyrillic script (i.e. monasteries, places of worship, Orthodox schools, village names). Representing approximately 14% of Croatia's population, Serbs interpreted this decree as a restriction of cultural expression and the erasure of evidence of Serbs historical presence.
Symbolism and historical parallels played a major role in the reinforcement of nationalist perceptions. The HDZ leadership, much like the Church, quickly dispelled any doubts about its interpretation of World War II events. Disregarding victim's historical experience, the Tudjman regime reinstated symbols harking back to the World War II period. One such move was the reintroduction of the red and white checkerboard flag or Shahovnica, which flew next to the Nazi Hakenkreuz. In 1990 it was proudly displayed in front of administration buildings and places of worship. The British war journalist covering the war, Anthony Loyd, encountered such symbolism in the Bosnian-Croat town of Tomislavgrad:
Ante Pavelic himself gave me the stiff-armed salute from a large photograph [hanging on the wall immediately facing the door]. Various smaller pictures, brown-edged with age, showed his Croat NDH troops in German coal-scuttle helmets that carried a large U center-pinned by a cross on their front: Ustasha. Swastikas, Sieg Heils and Wehrmacht helmets. These were still the symbols of gas chambers and goosesteps.
Additionally, the Tudjman regime brought back the World War II anthem, Lijepa Nasha (literally, Our Beauty). Such decisions would be the modern equivalent of Germans wearing the World War II Iron Cross, singing Deutschland Uber Alles while crossing into present-day Poland or the Czech Republic.
By the early 1990's, Church elites, particularly Cardinal Kuharic, began to distance itself from the nationalist policies of the HDZ. The Church was quite pleased with the defeat of the atheist communist regime; however, its successor became increasingly repressive toward the media and any other parties challenging its authoritarian rule. Kuharic publicly revealed, "the Church would guard its autonomy and respect the autonomy of state authority, as well as adopt a critical attitude toward public authority where it is necessary." The Church recognized the possible risks in remaining a political appendage of the HDZ's hyper-nationalism and, therefore, opted for an arms-length policy.
In the end, the Church experienced similar success as the SOC. It, too, succeeded in leaving behind its prior marginalized position under communism and developed an influential role in politics. Indeed, the Church was able to create a congruent ethnic identity with religion at its center. By supporting nationalist policies toward the erasure of Serb cultural and linguistic marks, the Church was able to create an exclusionary image of the 'other.'
Conclusion
Reviewing the actions of the SOC and the Church in Croatia, one realizes that the violent breakdown of Yugoslavia was not a clash between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. Rather, the actors employed concepts of nationalist identity formation along confessional lines with the ultimate goal of ethno-religious congruency.
Massive social changes worked to the advantage of both communities and to the most unfortunate disadvantage of Yugoslavia. The deteriorating economic situation, the rise in unemployment and faults of Tito's one-party system, coupled with the waning of Communist secularization, produced the necessary social vacuum for such nationalism. Thus, an atmosphere promoting competition between elites evolved and both churches intended to profit from this long-awaited opportunity to re-establish their social position.
The SOC and the Church masterfully utilized symbolism to support the realization of their goals. The SOC's re-activation of the mysticism of Kosovo and re-enforcement of the massive World War II atrocities suffered at the hands of the Pavelic regime created a concise center around which its observers began to orient themselves. It clarified the delineation between Serb and Croat by ascribing collective blame to the Croats, thus intensifying the markers of separation.
The Church in Croatia brought up its brutal World War II collaboration with little collective regret. Its deliberate failure to offer any form of atonement for the heinous acts of genocide was instrumental in instilling the historic fear among the Serbs and the SOC of yet another round of forced conversions. This reinforced the SOC's mentality of victimization and defender of the Serbian Orthodox flock. The uncontrollable cycle of identifying the other set into motion the formation of an exclusionary identity.
Both parties successfully achieved multi-symbol congruence. The patriarchs of both faiths, in particular Patriarch Pavle and Cardinal Kuharic, made strong efforts to link themselves to the emerging nationalist regimes. Although they would eventually realize the brutality of their respective allies and, consequently, attempted to distance themselves, their initial support created a solid foundation upon which particular identities could be constructed. By doing so, they made the division between politics and religion virtually unrecognizable.
The Church in Croatia mobilized other forms of symbolism, such as supporting the HDZ's Croatian-only language policy and flying the history-laden Shahovnica. The SOC's posthumous services on live television and the procession of Prince Lazar's bones throughout Yugoslavia certainly convinced many observers that Serbs intended to expand their state. These were, indeed, powerful forms of symbolism and produced great internal unification among their respective believers, while instilling fears in others.
Although a reduced Yugoslavia has emerged as ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse as ever, despite violent attempts to join Serb lands in a 'Greater Serbia,' Serb ethnicity still tends to imply membership to Eastern Orthodoxy. Through its own brutal military campaigns, notably the 1995 Oluja
and Blejsak offensives, Croatia has emerged as a largely mono-ethnic, mono-religious state. Thus, Croat ethnicity is inseparably tethered to Roman Catholicism.
Works Cited
Glenny, Misha. "Carnage in Bosnia, for Starters." New York Times, 29 July 1993: A23.
Liotta, P.H. Dismembering the State: the Death of Yugoslavia and Why It Matters. New York:
Lexington Books, 2000.
Thomas, Raju G.C. "History, Religion and National Identity." The South Slav Conflict:History,
Religion, Ethnicity and Nationalsim. Ed. Raju G.C.Thomas and H. Richard Friman. New
York: Garland Publishing, 1996. 11-42.
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