THE HOLOCAUST: IT'S IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN POLAND

by John T. Pawlikowski

Dr. John T. Pawlikowski, O.S.M., is a Servite priest and professor of social ethics at the Catholic Theological Union in Chicago, Illinois. Professor Pawlikowski is a noted ecumenical scholar who is on the Board of Associate Editors of the Journal of Ecumenical Studies and who writes prolifically on interreligious issues, particularly the Jewish-Christian dialogue.

Introduction

An in-depth examination of the Nazi Holocaust raises challenging questions relative to the relationship between church and society. As A nation whose people endured in a special way the horrors of Nazi ideology, contemporary Poland needs to ponder the significance of this cataclysmic event far more than it has. This is particularly important now as the national dialogue regarding a new constitutional understanding of church-state relations intensifies. Poles have often complained that their story of victimization has received insufficient attention in comparison to that of Hitler's primary enemies, the Jews. While there is some validity to this claim, it also has to be said in honesty that Poles (unlike the Jews) have largely ignored the lessons of the Holocaust as a source of personal and social meaning.

This presentation is intended to overcome that barrier in a modest way. But is offered with a caution. As an American of Polish descent my formative experience is largely that of the United States. Hence I do not intend to suggest any simplistic adaptation in Poland of the American response to the church-state question. There have been far too many attempts to impose ready-made U.S. solutions on Poland. Poland can learn from the U.S. experience in relating church and state. But contemporary discussions in Poland can likewise benefit the U.S. and other Western democracies where an urgent need exists for reexamination of some traditional attitudes.

Some Lessons from the Holocaust

The Holocaust has emerged in my mind as the beginning of a significantly new era, one in which the extermination of human life in guiltless fashion became thinkable and technologically feasible. It opened the door to an age in which dispassionate torture and the murder of millions became not just an action of a crazed despot, not merely an irrational expression of xenophobic fear, not just a drive for national security, but a calculated effort to reshape humanity supported by intellectual argumentation from the best and the brightest minds in a society. The Holocaust was not the product of a crazed despot but the brainchild of some of the most sophisticated philosophers and scientists Western society had yet patented. While the attempt to liquidate totally the Jewish people had everything to do with the legacy of Christian antisemitism, the Nazi ideology was not aimed at Jews alone. It would certainly be an unconscionable evasion of moral responsibility for Christians, including Polish Christians, to forget the many believing members of the church who collaborated with the Nazi attack on the Jews. Yet it would prove equally shortsighted to view the Holocaust as directed against the people Israel alone.

Nazism was as much opposed to Christianity in the final analysis as to Judaism. It resulted from basic currents in Western society perhaps even more than from traditional Christian antisemitism. As the Israeli historian Uriel Tal strongly maintained, it was meant to answer a universal crisis of the human person. Its expressed goal was the total transformation of human values. Liberation of humankind from what the Nazi theoreticians regarded as the shackles imposed by conventional beliefs in God, moral responsibility, redemption, sin and revelation constituted the final raison d'etre of their vision. They engaged in a deliberate attempt to restate classic theological notions in purely anthropological and political categories.

The Holocaust represented a deliberate decision on the part of the Nazi leadership to live within the condition of finitude while asserting for itself total power within this condition. As the theologian Michael Ryan has put it,

> Hitler's worldview amounted to the deliberate decision on the part of mass man to live within the limits of finitude without either the moral restraints or the hopes of traditional religion--in his case, Christianity.

Thus the basic moral question that emerges from a study of the Holocaust is how we today grapple with a new sense of freedom and power within humankind in a context of a highly sophisticated technological capability with the capacity for massive destruction.

It is within the framework of this basic understanding of the significance of the Holocaust that some of the specific lessons relative to the church-state question emerge. I would like to focus on five important ones: (1) the fundamental role of the church in the world, (2) the failures of Enlightenment liberalism in facing up to Nazism, (3) the protection of minorities, (4) the problem of theological pessimism relative to the world, and (5) the Nazi appreciation of the importance of non-rational elements in a society.

Scholarly debates over the churches' role during the Nazi period continue show little sign of reaching consensus. But compared with the initial studies in which total indictment was commonplace, the contemporary approaches tend to be considerably more nuanced. We cannot go into the plurality of current views in this presentation. The bottomline of many of them, if not most, is nonetheless worthy of our attention. Perceptions of the church's relationship to society from a theological standpoint proved decisive in determining the shape and the scope of Christian denominational response to the Nazi atrocities. Whether we are speaking of the theological perspective of a church body at large (i.e., the "Confessing Church") or an individual Christian leader (i.e., Pope Pius XII), historians, such as Fr. John Morley and Michael Marrus have offered convincing evidence of their impact on ecclesial response to the Holocaust. This means in my judgment that any church facing the need of redefining church-state relations in a major way, the challenge facing contemporary Poland, stands to profit a great deal from an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of Christian witness in the political sphere during the Nazi era. The is especially true for Poland which liveD through the Holocaust experience and fell victim itself to a measure of papal and hierarchial abandonment in its darkest hours.

An overall assessment of the data uncovered thus far regarding the church-state question during the Holocaust reveals two important perspectives. The first is succinctly summarized by Gordon Zahn whose writings were among the earliest on this topic. He argues that the overriding lesson for religious bodies coming from the Holocaust is that they can ill afford to become so enmeshed with a particular socio-political experiment that they lose their potential for constructive dissent and disobedience. He writes as follows:

> . . . the church must recognize that it has a stake in maintaining a separation of church and state as that separation is defined from its own perspective. It is a serious mistake to see that separation . . . only in terms of protecting the purity and independence of the secular order from unwarranted intrusions or domination by the spiritual. The problem as it developed in Germany . . . is also one of preserving the purity and independence of the spiritual community and its teaching from domination by the national state, with its definitions of situational needs and priorities.

The second perspective emerges from the several in-depth studies by Christian and Jewish scholars of Pius XII's approach to the Nazis. For both Morley and Marrus it is clear that preservation of the church at any cost was the prime value for Pius XII. To put this papal concern in proper perspective, it must be seen as a direct outgrowth of a deep-seated belief in the church as a transcendent institution which alone possessed the avenues of human salvation. In such a perspective all else, even the preservation of individual human lives, necessarily assumed a secondary importance. Pius' well-known (and much criticized) reserve regarding both the fate of the Jews as well as the Poles under the nazis was the result of this vision of the church's role in the world.

It is clear in retrospect that this approach to the church-world relationship seriously compromised Christian integrity. Clearly the Holocaust shows that there is no ultimately meaningful paradigm for the church that is indifferent to the concrete plight of human beings. Final salvation may remain a central dimension of Christian belief. But, in light of the Holocaust, it can no longer be the controlling force in defining the church's relationship to society. Preservation of human life must have an equal, and at times more immediate, role. The willingness of the hierarchy in Malawi to stand up to the government in the face of explicit threats of extermination to protest gross human rights violations is but one example of a newly emerging perspective in recent Christianity.

The second major conclusion produced by recent Holocaust studies concerns the inability of Enlightenment tradition, so dominant in pre-war Germany and France, to withstand the onslaught of Nazi ideology. A word of caution is called for with regard to this conclusion. Those of us who are generally sympathetic to the Western liberal tradition (and I count myself among them) must honestly face up the failures of this tradition during the Hitler period. But we must avoid giving the impression, as some in the churches tend to do, that liberalism/modernism had a far greater hand in the success of the Nazi effort than the religious traditions. Confronting the failures of the liberal tradition during the Holocaust in no way removes the serious obligation incumbent upon the churches to examine the pervasive role played by many Christian teachings in the event.

Rabbi Irving Greenberg is especially effective in pointing to the ineffectiveness of the Enlightenment tradition in the face of the Nazi challenge. "How naive the nineteenth-century polemic with religion appears to in

retrospect," he writes:

> how simple Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and many others. The entire structure of autonomous logic and sovereign human reason now takes on a sinister character . . . All the talk in the world about "atavism" cannot obscure the way in which such behavior is the outgrowth of democratic and modern values . . . This responsibility must be shared not only by Christianity, but by the Enlightenment and democratic cultures as well. Their apathy and encouragement strengthened the will and capacity of the murders to carry out the genocide.

In capsule form the failures of the Enlightenment perspective are to be found in its excessive individualism, its general consigning of religion to the `private' realm," and its excessive rationalism which made it no match for the highly emotional public rallies organized by the Nazis about which we shall speak a bit later. To the extent that contemporary Western perspectives on church-state separation (including the perspective found in the II Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Freedom) are embedded in the Enlightenment tradition, and the linkage is significant, the effectiveness of these perspectives in dealing with the sinister, some would say even `demonic,' dimensions of modern culture are called into question.

Another important lesson emerging from a study of the Holocaust concerns the church's attitude towards religious minorities. We have already stressed the paramount importance attached to the preservation of the institutional church, seen as the vehicle of salvation, during the pontificate of Pius XII. A further consequence of this outlook was the prevailing attitude towards religious minorities under attack by Hitler, especially the Jews. Holocaust historian Nora Levin, who joins Michael Marrus and John Morley in subscribing to the "church preservation" thesis regarding Pius' regime, says that this approach resulted in the Jews being regarded as "unfortunate expendables." Their destruction became a regrettable by-product of the effort to sustain the church. In the words of another Holocaust scholar Helen Fein Jews fell outside the "universe of moral obligation."

Clearly in retrospect such an attitude cannot be accepted as morally responsible ecclesial behavior. The vision of the church that must direct post-Holocaust Christian thinking is one that sees the survival of non-Catholics as integral to the authentic survival of the church itself. There is no way for Christianity to survive meaningfully if it allows the death of other peoples to become a by-product of its efforts at self-preservation.

A fourth significant implication of the Holocaust for church-world understanding today is the danger of a fundamentally pessimistic outlook on the world. The Austrian Catholic philosopher Friedreich Heer has been especially helpful in pointing up this aspect of the Holocaust and its continuing dangers. For Heer, Catholicism's failure to confront the Holocaust with the full force of its moral potential is symptomatic of the church's reaction to the major forms of evil, especially to war and the possibility of nuclear destruction. For him, the principal problems lies in the church's traditional withdrawal from history which nurtures a deep-seated pessimism towards the world:

> The withdrawal of the church from history has created that specifically Christian and ecclesiastical irresponsibility toward the world, the Jew, the other person, even the Christian himself, considered as a human being--which was the ultimate cause of past catastrophes and may be the cause of a final catastrophe in the future.

Heer attributes this fatalistic tendency primarily to the dominance of the "Augustinian principle" in Western Christian thought. This "principle" views the world essentially under the category of sin. It was this basically `fatalistic' regard for the world that muted the church's response at the time of the Holocaust and may do so again unless it is substantially reversed. The only cure for this centuries-long moral cancer in Christianity, according to Heer, is for the church to liberate itself from the dominance of the "Augustinian principle" and return to the Jewish roots of Jesus' own piety, to the original vision of the Hebrew Scriptures in which the human person felt the call to be both God's creature and a responsible moral partner with God in the world.

The final implication comes from the analyses done of the famous Nazi public rallies. Scholars who have studied the documents and the films of these events testify to the power they had over the masses in generating unquestioned allegiance. Without question they were a form of `civil worship.' It was these rallies for which liberal ethics, dominated as it was by rationalism, had no effective response. What the rallies clearly show is the tremendous force that popular culture can be in setting public values. In light of the Holocaust it has became apparent that no full response to the church-state question is possible without a major focus on value formation in the realm of popular culture. The Holocaust rallies and their devastating effect are convincing proof that the issue of religion and public life cannot be narrowed solely to legal, constitutional questions, as important and central as these remain.

The Current Church-State Discussion in Poland in Light of the Holocaust

Newspapers recently reported on intensive discussions in Poland regarding the reacquisition of old church property as well as the newly sanctioned teaching of religion in the nation's public schools. In terms of the latter issue some fifteen hundred teenagers, for example, marched on the Education Ministry in Warsaw chanting, "Stelmachowski (i.e., the Polish education minister) must resign!" Some burned prayer books and yelled, "God save us from priests!" While admittedly this group does not necessarily speak for the majority of youth, their vocal protest does symbolize the depth of feeling that the complex of concrete issues connected with the church-state question has engendered within the Polish population.

Three trends are clearly discernible to the outside observer of the current Polish scene. The first draws upon a longstanding current in the antinational culture as it tries to restore the church to its traditional role as guardian of the country's public life and morals. The second and third trends bear some definite similarities, particularly their common opposition to the outlook associated with the first trend. But they have their distinctive features as well. Trend number two, generally linked with the intellectual leadership of the Solidarity Movement, tends to favor a basically Western liberal model for church-state relations, particularly as this liberal model was incorporated into Catholicism by II Vatican Council in its historic Declaration on Religious Liberty in 1965. The third trend fundamentally rejects both the classical polish model as well as the Western liberal model as adequate for the needs of post-Communist Period. Those who follow this path believe that Poland must carve out a new model that combines genuine church impact on society while continuing to maintain its separateness from the prevailing political order.

The current primate of Poland, Cardinal Jozef Glemp, is identified by most commentators on Polish political life as a definite supporter of the first trend. In a recent sermon he spoke out strongly against those public figures and journalists who, in his view, are trying to muzzle the church and push it to the sidelines of public political debate. He especially highlighted their opposition to religious instruction in the public schools, to restrictions on abortion, and to church support for candidates representing "Christian values." These were his actual words:

Today, those people who went up in the world thanks to the support they received from the Church often say that the Church should not voice its views in public, be it on the subject of the legal system or school education. But the Church will not let itself be hushed up.

In the actual political realm the principal proponent of the first trend is the Christian National Union, one of the leading parties in Poland's current fragile coalition government. Combining populist calls for an egalitarian society with a summons to re-evangelize the country and return it to its Catholic values, the CNU has strongly attacked the tough monetarist policies initiated by first leaders of post-Communist Poland. It has urged the cessation of the influx of Western goods and placed considerable emphasis on welfare. The party has termed the original designers of Poland's new economic plan "the architects of recession." A major 1992 CNU policy document entitled "Polish Matters" offer the people of Poland "Christianity, Church, Fatherland and Honor" as antidotes for the pain of present economic hardship. Responsibility for the severe downturn in the economy is placed squarely on the nation's perceived enemies: "the pseudo-tolerant left" (including most liberals), the shallow-minded intelligentsia which lacks true intellectual credentials, the "immoral West," and the European Community technocrats in Brussels.

The urgent need in Poland at the moment, according to the vision of "Polish Matters," is the wholesale moral re-education of the youth. Young people must be made morally pure and physically strong if the nation is to prosper. Present-day youth will need to become moral crusaders in order to combat the threats posed by increased crime, alcoholism, and anarchist/pacifist trends. The document warns that "a true Catholic is not a meek little lamb who easily reaches compromise."

The CNU's missionary fervor has generated strong criticism, even from within the ranks of its political partners. Jerzy Kuleta, who leads the strongly libertarian Realpolitik Union in Cracow accuses the party of acting as if it had been given a divine sanction to make political decisions for Poland. And Jaroslaw Kaczynski of the Center Alliance argues that the quickest way to erode Christian influence in Polish public life is to support the policies of the CNU. But CNU press spokesperson Ryszard Czarnecki has held his ground against the attacks. Poland, in fact all of de-Christianized Europe, needs a new social framework fundamentally grounded in the church's social teaching. CNU statements clearly imply that in the eyes of the party faithful Poland may be the only hope for the spiritual regeneration of the entire European continent.

Though the Polish episcopate officially remained neutral during the parliamentary elections of 1991 some

in the church clearly welcomed the CNU's electoral success. In league with Catholic umbrella organizations during the campaign, CNU candidates gained the support of clergy and congregations. And following upon Cardinal Glemp's ambiguous election-time comment that no Catholic can belong to a party that opposes "Christian values," posters went up in Gdansk and others cities listing those parties which supposedly met this "Christian" criterion. The liberal Democratic Union whose position on the critical abortion question had remained ambiguous in terms of public policy was excluded from the list. But the neofascist National Faction did appear, a party whose followers openly espouse antisemitism and campaigns of violence against the country's ethnic minorities.

The second major approach to the church-state question is generally espoused by the liberal and intellectual elements of the society, including many of he religious and secular leaders of Solidarity and the first elected post-Communist communist. It would also find considerable support among the membership of the clubs of Catholic Intellectuals (KIK). As explained above, the roots of this model are definitely in the Western liberal tradition, a tradition which Fr. John Courtney Murray, S.J., managed to have canonized (with modifications) at the II Vatican Council. For Poland its proponents would tend to favor a clear constitutional separation between church and state. The fundamental ethos behind this trend is ably summarized by a statement from Jerzy Turowicz, lay editor of the Catholic paper Tygodnik Powszechny which played such a leading role in the development of the freedom movement in Poland. Turowicz insists that the moment totalitarian rule falls and it finds itself in a democratic system, the public takes its destiny in its own hands and does not need the Church as a mediator in political affairs. It would appear that Turowicz is speaking in a manner that make his comments prescriptive rather than merely descriptive from his point of view.

The final trend I would highlight would seem to concur with those espousing the second perspective in one critical area--church and state should remain fundamentally distinct. The old Polish nationalistic model is not a viable option for post-Communist Poland in their mind. Major endorsements of this line of thought have come from Jozef Tischner, philosopher and important advisor to the Solidarity Movement (who also influenced the text of the papal encyclical *Laborem Exercens*) and Bishop Jozef Zycinski, also a philosopher and bishop of Tarnow. Zycinski, one of the country's youngest ordinaries at forty-three, is rapidly emerging as a key Catholic social critic in post-Communist Poland. Both see the Church in the Western world as in a recession in terms of impact on public values. Hence, in their mind, the Western `individualistic' solution is not what Poland needs at the moment, nor what Europe needs. Each conveys the sense that Poland has the opportunity to create a new model in which the Church does not become merely an adjunct of the state apparatus, but in retaining its constitutional independence is able to offer to the public culture a major critique of prevailing values, at times even in a prophetic manner.

Tischner has addressed the subject on a number of occasions. Writing in Tygodnik Powszechny, he argues that there is a danger that in striving for another power, Church authorities will deprive the Church of the power which it really possesses. When the Church did not have any power it turned out it had power. May the opposite not turn out to be true.

On the other hand, Tischner also clearly implies the basic inadequacy of what he terms "negative liberalism," most associated in his mind with the American system, where the State interferes as little as possible in the affairs of citizens in general and hence religion becomes largely a matter for the private, personal realm of the individual. Tischner believes the State's basic duty is to guarantee public peace. But he does not feel the State has an obligation to implement the ethical ideals of Christianity. Such implementation can only come about in his judgement by a well-developed social scientific approach on the part of the Church, something the Polish Church has developed in earnest since the emergence of Solidarity. So Tischner definitely envisions a public role for the Church with substantial public impact. But, unlike the proponents of the first trend, he does not see this influence coming through constitutional legislation. Such an approach might in fact prove the undoing of Church influence in public life.

The Catholic approach to church-state matters has changed many times in the course of history according to Tischner. The time is ripe for yet another major change that does not involve merely an attempt by Church leaders to obtain political power. The model for the new era is not yet clear. But it has one central requisite. It must overcome the devastating impact of "*homo sovieticus*" and all the pervasive encounter with fundamental evil that was the lot of East Europeans for a half-century or more. In a major paper presented to the founding meeting of the European Society for Catholic Theology held in Stuttgart, Germany, Tischner paid special attention to this dimension of the Church's task. It is a task which in his judgment the Eastern churches alone can undertake with authenticity. All Western thought (with the possible exception of the writings of Emmannuel Levinas) stands impotent in the face of the mystery of evil revealed to Eastern peoples these past several decades because of its fundamental reliance on rationalism.

Overcoming this evil and its by-product, "*homo sovieticus,*" is the fundamental challenge facing the Church in terms of contemporary European society. This can happen only through the blend of conversion and social scientific analysis that the Church can provide. Any attempt to impose religious values on society without such transformation first occurring will prove pointless. It is very likely the first new model will come from Eastern Europe because only here had the power of evil been genuinely experienced.

Thus far we have examined what politicians, religious leaders, and intellectuals in Poland have said about the church-state question. What about the masses? Where do the ordinary rank and file stand on the question? One survey at least can provide some indicators of general public opinion. The weekly Polityka has reported the following results from a poll of ordinary citizens:

Aim for a model of government developed and tested in the West -- 47%

Create its own model based upon national and Christian tradition -- 52%

Be a Catholic state in which the church will play an important role in political life -- 18%

Be a neutral State where the role of the Church is limited to issue of religion and morality -- 82%

Some Observations on the Current Polish Discussions

In light of the lessons which have emerged from a study of the Holocaust the following observations regarding the present thinking on church-state matters in Poland seem to follow. First of all, in line with Professor Gordon Zahn's warning, it would be to the advantage of the Polish Church to maintain its distinctiveness (and freedom) from the State. Both the liberals and the proponents of the third trend are quite correct in seeing this need if the Church is to retain an independent voice in the nation's public affairs. Official recognition may well mean official cooperation.

In light of Irving Greenberg's perceptive analysis of the liberal Enlightenment tradition during the Holocaust it will also prove necessary to question the validity of its church-state model. In my judgment Tischner and Zycinski have grasped a critical dimension of the problem in arguing that a `rationalistic' perspective on church-state questions is inadequate by itself. They are correct in recognizing that in light of the Holocaust and the experience of Marxism, we cannot address the church-state problematic without acknowledging the impact of public culture generally upon all individuals in a given society as well as the continuing force of evil. If this dual challenge is to be addressed, we will need to take far more seriously the significance of what the social theologian Reinhold Niebuhr has termed the "vitalistic" side of humanity. And the "vitalistic" side of humanity is not to be overtaken by the forces of evil, still very real in our day. The insight that the proponents of the third trend bring to light, and a correct one it is, involves the basic recognition that in our day the critical aspect of the church-state problematic may no longer be the legal one so much as the cultural one.

But the third trend also stands in need of critique in light of the Holocaust. First of all, it must re-examine its wholesale rejection of the Western liberal tradition, particularly as that tradition has been appropriated by Western Christianity. For one thing, this tradition has been far more open to the basic protection of minority rights, including religious rights. While minorities are not as big a social issue in Poland as elsewhere, the problem does exist. Moreover, treatment of minorities is in many ways the barometer of national morality. Poland needs to address this issue better than it has, including its religious dimensions.

Even more importantly Tischner's views in particular seem to verge on the kind of basic pessimism about human possibility against which Heer has spoken so strongly. There exist real social dangers in such pessimism that Tischner fails to acknowledge. Professor Nicholas Lash's (Cambridge University) remarks about Tischner's presentation to the Stuttgart assembly of European theologians are very much to the point:

> In an hour's address in which the love of God was never mentioned, "evil" was absolutized, "diabolized" (as Christian Duquoc said later), externalized and swollen to such vast proportions as to blot out all rays of sunlight from the world. There was something close to reverence here, something bordering on a kind of gnosticism in the epistemic privilege claimed for those alone who have met "evil" face to face.

If the third trend is to make a lasting contribution to the church-state debate, it will have to shed some of this extreme pessimism without mitigating the depth of evil experienced during the Marxist era.

Concluding Comments -- Where Does Poland Go From Here?

It is not up to an American of Polish descent to offer prescriptions for the final resolution of the church-state problem in Poland. There have been far too many attempt of late to impose American models on the country.

Poland must find its own distinct way through this thicket. It is in place, however, for an outside observer to offer some perspectives. In this spirit let me try.

The old nationalistic model of Catholicism's role in Poland ought to be abandoned as quickly as possible. It is a dead end for both state and church. In its place some combination of trends two and three, with the modifications noted in the previous section of this paper, needs to be forged. In developing this model, Polish civil and religious leaders might take a hard look at the "public church model" originally developed in America by Ernst Troeltsch and more recently advocated by Martin Marty and J. Bryan Hehir. In a 1986 address to the Catholic Theology Society of America Hehir stated that the role of such a public church is less that of providing definitive answers to complex socio-political questions than it is to act as a catalyst moving the public argument to grapple with questions of moral values, ethical principles and the human and religious meaning of policy choices. This catalytic role does not exclude--particularly the Catholic tradition--moments when the moral position will require a firm, unyielding position on an issue, but these specific moral choices are made in the context of a broader teaching style.

To the context that Poland can provide Western society with a distinctive version of a public church model, to that measure will it not only be well on the way to a resolution of its own church-state difficulties but also begin to contribute constructively to new thinking on this question in Western Europe and North America. For this to happen, the proponents of trends two and three will need to enter a national dialogue far more than has been the case up till now. As they dialogue, they will also need to keep a watchful eye on developments in Western Europe and North America. Our challenge in this part of the world, as we continue to reshape our understanding of the problematic in an American context, is to stand ready to contribute to the Polish dialogue in whatever way we can while being equally prepared to weigh seriously its perspectives.