A STRATEGY FOR SOCIAL RECONCILIATION IN THE ETHNIC

CONFLICT IN TRANSYLVANIA

By Cristian G. Romocea

Cristian G. Romocea is currently engaged in a doctoral research degree with the University of Wales through the Oxford Centre for Mission Studies (UK). His research reflects on the emerging social thinking of the Church in democratic Romania. The following article is a condensed version of his unpublished Master thesis. He obtained his Bachelor and Masters Degrees from the Evangelical Theological Seminary Osijek, Croatia. He is a member of the Romanian Independent Evangelical Church.

Introduction

In March 1990, a violent street confrontation between the Romanian population and the Hungarian ethnic minority in the town of Târgu MureÅ? became a clear sign that the situation of the ethnic minorities in post-Ceausescu's Romania had to be asserted without delay. Located in the heart of Transylvania, a geographical territory which has been co-inhabited by various ethnic groups for many centuries, the town of Târgu MureÅ? consists of a large Hungarian community. This violent clash, occurring just over three months after the collapse of the totalitarian regime in Romania, was a first warning sign indicating the social instability which the previous regime managed to create. As Romania was preparing to embark on its long journey towards democracy, the ethnic minorities' problem posed one of the greatest dangers to social and political stability. Although the outcomes of this explosion of interethnic hate were eventually minor, due mainly to the significant work carried out by members and groups of the Romanian civil society and the moderate responses of the political representatives of the Hungarian and Romanian governments, it highlighted how quickly such unresolved tensions inherited from the past could intensify and lead to serious interethnic and international conflicts in Eastern Europe.

Over the past two hundred years the Romanian and Hungarian ethnic communities in Transylvania have experienced oscillating degrees of tension which have escalated during communism with the intensification of radical nationalism, foreigners' phobia and crass violation of human rights. This hostility which has built up especially within the largest ethnic minority in Romania emerged with the change in the political milieu in Romania and was threatening the precarious social and political stability of the post-communist society. The task of reconstructing a democratic Romanian society required, and continues to do so, the affirmation of a political strategy or ethic in which significant action needed to be taken toward the alleviation of the interethnic conflict. In this article, the concern of the author is with proposing a strategy for understanding the theological, political, and social factors involved in dealing with ethnic conflict. Such a strategy will entail analyzing the nature of conflict and possibilities for resolution with reference to the concept of social reconciliation. Along this proposal, the ethnic conflict in Transylvania will serve as a case-study which will allow assessing the relevance of this strategy to a concrete social and political context.

Social Reconciliation and its Theological Meaning

In the ministry of reconciliation a distinction is being made between individual and social reconciliation. The prominent Catholic theologian Robert Schreiter describes best the distinction between individual reconciliation, which refers to a victim's damaged humanity restored by God and by a supportive community offering safety, accompaniment and hospitality, and social reconciliation, defined as the process of reconstructing the moral order of a society.¹ The transition between these two types of reconciliation is inherent in God's work of restoration in the hearts of the victims of ethnic conflict. This restoration should be continued by these reconciled individuals who could be in a better position to bring about social reconciliation. There are, however, three difficulties that can arise when discussing a strategy for social reconciliation. One comes from the fact that there is still a lot to be learned about reconciliation. Another problem is that even where a formal process of social reconciliation has been completed, it usually takes years to judge the effectiveness of the strategy used. A third impediment is that no two social or political situations are alike. In crafting a strategy for social reconciliation reference has to be made to concrete situations where ethnic conflict persists.

Social reconciliation should neither be regarded as an abstract mode of viewing and addressing ethnic conflict in a society, nor as another form of public apologizing. Schreiter is again illuminating when he warns that social reconciliation "â?¦is not only a matter of healing memories and receiving forgiveness, it is also about changing the structures in society that provoked, promoted and sustained violence."² Whereas political forgiveness is one person, group, or nation's moral response to another's injustice, reconciliation includes at least two parties coming together in mutual respect. One may forgive and yet not reconcile. This idea is best articulated in Miroslav Volf's "theology of embrace," where he differentiates between the "will to embrace" and the "embrace itself."³ Whereas the former is not dependent on the other party, the latter involves two parties in agreement. We can easily apply this illustration to the relationship between political forgiveness and social reconciliation and conclude that social reconciliation in an ethnic conflict should be perceived as a process which involves both parties that are locked into conflict working towards resolution.

Furthermore, there is a risk in discussing about concrete strategies for social reconciliation without making direct reference to the theological underpinnings of this concept. The ministry of reconciliation represents most of all a call to come under the cross of the Crucified. At the heart of the Christian message, reconciliation speaks about the changed relations between God and humanity as the result of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. According to 2 Corinthians 5:19, reconciliation is the fundamental purpose of the Christ-event. Dr. Peter Kuzmic has been among the strong voices reminding Christians that they cannot speak about reconciliation without speaking of the cross.⁴ From the experience of the recent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia people have learned that: "Reconciliation is not brought about simply by a technical problem-solving mentality. It is a response to God's reconciling initiative in Christ."⁵

Another notable scholar who has contributed in recent years to the theological dialogue around the reconciling significance of the cross of Jesus Christ is Jürgen Moltmann.⁶ In The Crucified God, Moltmann stresses that the only way we can consider the consequences of the theology of the cross for the economic, social and political sphere is through a "political hermeneutics of liberation."⁷ In this political hermeneutics of liberation, the crucified Christ realizes "solidarity" with every social form of struggle against inhumanity.⁸ For Moltmann, the reconciliation that Christ's crucifixion brings into society is linked to the theme of atonement.⁹ Not only is Christ capable of suffering, identifying Himself with the victims of the world and with the guilt of the perpetrators through the cross (Christ our Brother), but Christ also atones for the victims, for the perpetrators and for the community in which both victims and perpetrators live together (Christ the Savior).¹⁰ This divine atonement for sin, for injustice and violence on earth, surpasses the mere solidarity of Christ with the victims by illustrating God's sacrificial passion and love for humanity. In this way, He becomes "the God of the godless."¹¹ Therefore, true social reconciliation can only be achieved under the cross of Christ: "Here [under the cross], rather, is where the godless are justified, enemies are reconciled, prisoners are set free, the poor are enriched, and the sad are filled with hope."¹²

The legitimate question which arises from such a perspective on the role of the cross in the ministry of reconciliation concerns the role of the Church, as the community of the crucified Christ, to the conveying of this ministry in conflict-ridden societies. According to the Pauline message in 2 Corinthians 5:17-19, the Church understands herself to be delegated with the ministry of reconciliation. Thus, it is because of its moral place in the society that the Church should aid the creation of communities of reconciliation particularly in situations of ethnic conflict. Karl Barth's suggestions are enlightening as to how Church and politics should function alongside each other: "The Church acknowledges and promotes the state insofar as service of the neighbor, which is the purpose of the state, is necessarily included in its own message of reconciliation and is thus its own concern."13 Having arrived to such an understanding of social reconciliation, the Romanian Church could become a more significant influence to the conflict resolution in Transylvania by helping the Romanian state fulfill its own purpose particularly in relation to the victimized groups that struggle under its jurisdiction.

Renarration of the Pastof Enmity

Social reconciliation cannot be limited to the role of the Church to the alleviation of the ethnic conflict. As mentioned in the introduction of this article, our concern is with the formulation of a strategy for reconciliation that is aware of the theological, political and social factors involved in dealing with conflict resolution. In the following pages the focus will be on the role that the political leadership of a country can play in the reconciliation process.

In situations of ethnic conflict nationalism often plays a critical role to the fostering of hate between the groups, mostly because of its reliance on the interpretation of historical accounts. The renowned expert in International Relations, Professor Fred Halliday pointed out that retelling history is central to nationalism: "History, and legal claims, are there to be defined by the goals of the community. Selection, distortion, manipulation, plain fabrication are an intrinsic part of the operation."14 Thus, in its relationship to nationalism, history is important for presenting the origins of cultures and moral communities. The "fallacy of autogenetic cultures", as Halliday coins the historical assumption that there is such a thing as a given, or timeless origin of a national community, can divert people from realizing that nationalism is a product of the social practice of definition, of instruction, of writing, and of enforcement.15

Social reconciliation cannot take place without exploring what past wrongs have been inflicted upon the perpetrated ethnic group. Absent the willingness of the antagonistic groups involved in conflict to renarratehistory from the perspective of those who were its agents and its sufferers, there will be little opportunity for bringing social reconciliation and restoration of a moral society. In his book on forgiveness in politics, the theologian Donald Shriver stressed that only remembering history morally would protect the future against the repetition of the human atrocities of the past.16 How would such a memory of the past of enmity have to be addressed, in order to bring reconciliation? Shriver identifies such a remembering to be closely linked with a moral judgment of wrong, injustice and injury.17Without an agreement between both parties that there is something to reconcile, the entire reconciliation process will most probably be halted.

Most ethnic conflicts draw their strength from moral judgments of irreversible events that have taken place in the past. However, in societies scarred by such political conflicts, antagonistic groups of people tend to have difficulties agreeing on the moral significance of their actions. This phenomenon, which Volf describes as "the predicament of partiality," leads to situations of conflict where each one of the hostile groups or communities sees itself as a victim.18In such circumstances, thus, an important element for the process of reconciliation is the retelling, the renarration of the history of enmity which will allow the victims to gain a new memory of the past.

However, the danger with the renarration of history is that it may generate other tales of historical glory and plausible explanations of past failures, so that the hope for reconciliation is lost. The way out of this predicament is to focus the historical investigation on the real interests and power bases of conflicting groups who have manufactured those accounts for political benefits. For example, nationalism has led to a whole industry of historical claims, much of it fabricated, for definite goals such as achieving, or in other cases securing, certain territorial claims. Halliday writes: "The challenge to history, and tradition, assumes practical relevance in regard to what is one of the most contested areas of nationalist conflict, territory. Nationalism, by deriving legitimacy from the past, entails an ethic of territorial claims according to which primacy of claims results from priority of occupation. The first ones there have the best claims."19

With its territorial claims, nationalism is at the heart of most repressive versions of history, and the account of Transylvania is no exception. That is how retelling of the past of a nation often becomes a hunt for territories because at the heart of this longing lies a desire for political power. As the Romanian philosopher Emil Cioran emphasized in his characteristically pessimistic note: "The myths of a nation are its vital truths. They might not coincide with the truth; this is of no importance. The supreme sincerity of a nation towards itself is manifested in the rejection of self-criticism, in vitalization through its own illusions. And, does a nation seek the truth? A nation seeks power."20

The history of Transylvania is notorious for two contradictory historical accounts narrated by Romanian and Hungarian historiography. In her work on Transylvania, the respected political psychologist Alina Mungiu-Pippidi indicates that the most unusual thing about the Romanian and Hungarian versions of the history of Transylvania lies in the fact that both disputed theories represent the very origins of both states (Romania and its neighboring Hungary).21 At one end, the theory of "Daco-Roman-Romanian continuity" asserted that the Romanians are the descendants of two noble races, the Dacians and the Romans whose descendants have permanently inhabited the territories which were later called Wallachia and Transylvania, where Romanians were the majority population in the eighteenth century.22 At the other end, the "Röslerian hypothesis of immigration" proposed the theory that the Daco-Romans have been forced out of their territory during the invasion of the Roman emperor Aurelian (AD 270-275) and by the time they migrated back into Wallachia and Transylvania many centuries later, the Hunic tribes have already established their kingdom extending into the Panonian and Transylvanian geographical regions.

However, with the question of the authenticity of historical evidence ruled out the moment the debate had left the academic setting where it initially belonged, these theories of ethnic continuity became tools of political manipulation for clearly identifiable political ends.23 Hugh Seton-Watson had no doubt when he argued that these two rival theories have been perpetuated by nationalistic interest, while both of them are lacking conclusive evidences for support.24

The same mistake that the Romanian representatives of the Transylvanian School have committed when they borrowed the theory of Daco-Roman-Romanian continuity in an attempt to justify, before King Leopold II, their demand for equal political status with the other three recognized national groups in Transylvania, by gaining political representation in the Transylvanian Diet, was reiterated by the Hungarian politicians who used Rösler's immigration theory to secure political and territorial ownership over Transylvania against the Romanians' demands for political representation. The discriminating policies carried out by the alternate political leadership of Transylvania which continued between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, particularly amplified during communism, amounted to a conflictogenic environment which is responsible for the distorted self-perception of the people in Transylvania. As long as these effects continue to be perpetuated even after the collapse of communism through national propaganda, they will foster a culture where reconciliation between the ethnic Hungarian minorities in Transylvania and the Romanian population will be impossible.

Similarly, emerging Hungarian national ideology which in the years since the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe has re-invigorated national themes such as nostalgia about Transylvania is shaping a conflict-producing national identity of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Transylvania. Whether or not such a resurgence of radical forms of nationalism may be the direct result of the crumbling of the communist states in Europe, they have already claimed the lives of thousands of innocent victims in the wars of Former Yugoslavia. "All across Eastern Europe, a monolithic communist ideology was replaced by conflicting pluralist nationalist ideologies; whatever animosities communism repressed, these exploded once communism was gone", explained Peter Kuzmic.25 It is therefore worrying that, with the exception of ex-Yugoslavia where ethnic conflict led to war, Romania is the country where in the last decade general crisis and national polarization reached the highest degrees in the whole of Eastern Europe. The new political elite in Romania in Hungary should regard as crucial the handling of the ethnic minority problem and ought to take concrete steps toward social reconciliation in order to counter the ethnic strife and radical ideologies pervading their societies.

Many errors have been made in Romania especially during the Iliescu regime (1990-1996) when nationalist thinkers were encouraged to continue to redefine and re-evaluate the national history in ways that suited the governing party's own agenda.26 Several historiographical treatises about Transylvania found their way into the Romanian society in this period, some of them resulting from individual efforts, while others from elaborate projects sustained by nationalist Romanian intelligentsia. Telling gestures, like the visit of President Iliescu to Cluj in March 1991 which coincided with the two hundredth anniversary of the Supplex Libellus Vallachorum, the petition edited and presented to the emperor Leopold II by the Transylvanian School, made obvious that fact that the use of history for the safeguarding of the unitary character of the Romanian state has not been abandoned. National preservation became the main goal behind the persistence in recent years of references to the idealized Romanian past in the political public propaganda, newspapers of certain radical parties and Romanian history textbooks.

The Romanian history textbooks continue to be pervaded by idyllic accounts of the history of Transylvania, while the Hungarian history textbooks used by the ethnic minority in Romania present their conflicting version of the history of the territory. When, in one of the Romanian history textbooks published after 1989, the Romanian voivodes were presented less grandiosely than it was used to during Communism, the scholars reacted fiercely to what they considered to be the dishonoring of the Romanian nation's greatness. When Lucian Boia, one of the few notable Romanian historians, warned, during the 1996 International Colloquium on the Textbooks of Romanian History held in Iasi, that the current textbooks still reflect the nineteenth century romantic view of Romanian history with its myths, his view was severely criticized by his colleagues historians.27

Repeated allusions have been made in Romanian public political discourse to the danger ethnic minorities pose to the decentralization of the Romanian state and the dismantling of the unitary character of the country as affirmed by the national Constitution. So much so that during the 1996 presidential electoral campaign, President Iliescu, in a desperate effort to avoid the inevitable defeat in the elections, inserted an anti-Hungarian speech in which he warned the voters about the imminent Hungarian danger in case they would vote the opposition. In the course of his address, the Romanian president displayed a map of Europe obtained from Samuel Huntington's book on the clash of civilizations,28 in which Transylvania was included in Western Europe, and identified Huntington's theory with the hidden plans of the Western 'outsiders'.

Hungarian post-communist society had experienced a similar resurgence of nationalist propaganda in relation to Transylvania. This resurgence was materialized in the increased number of articles and volumes that were published on the subject in the last decade. From incendiary articles in newspapers to the setting up of non-governmental organizations demanding the return of Transylvania to Hungary, nationalist elements have reacted with an unprecedented euphoria. Although much of this propaganda that emerged in the post-communist Hungary was exaggerated in the Romanian mass media, dozens of books and articles are available to indicate the intense preoccupation of the populist Hungarian writers with the history of Transylvania. Moreover, imprudent declarations of certain Hungarian politicians in regard to Transylvania became the subject of much criticizing and political manipulation in Romanian mass-media. Whether they occurred in volumes of history, in newspapers, local political discourses or at lobbying meetings in Western countries, these assertions amounted to a resurgence of radical nationalist tendencies which is not favorable for the democratic process in which Hungarian society is currently progressing. Renarrating the past in a manner that feeds existing national anxieties of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Transylvania will continue to fuel ethnic conflicts and prevent the society from experiencing social reconciliation.

Would another account of the history of Transylvania become the solution to the interethnic conflict between the Hungarians and Romanians? As Emeritus Professor of Theology Haddon Willmer stressed:

"â?¦we do not have to spend our energies on the kind of historical work which does not free people from pride in and dependency on some past, which continually draws them back with fascination to play over the issues of the past as though they were still playable, as though somehow the past can be different, if it can be shown a different version of the past is true. But pure historical argument is relatively weak; and the most powerful uses of the past are those that feed existing identities and anxieties and so keep people going in new conflicts."29

The task of achieving reconciliation should emphasize this crucial limitation of any renarration of the history. Only remembering the past in a way that reveals the real interests and power bases inherent in the conflicting interpretations of Transylvania's history may help the conflict resolution process. The purpose of this remembering of the past of enmity should be to bring the two divided groups to a place where they can begin to contemplate reconciliation. Much of the responsibility for this objective rests with the political leadership in Romania and Hungary. Gyorgy Frunda, the former representative of the moderate wing of the Democratic Union of the Hungarians in Romania party pointed out that the reciprocal lack of knowledge is one of the primary causes of "the easiness with which the interethnic tension is maintained or even stimulated."30

The willingness of the political leadership in Romania to promote interethnic reconciliation will be favorable not only to the internal stability of the Romanian society which struggles enough at the economic level, but also to the advancement in the process of European integration. It is fortunate that both Romania and Hungary are preparing to join the European Union and therefore have to subscribe to the European demands concerning the handling of the ethnic minorities. Change, however, shouldn't be arbitrated and imposed by international organizations but ought to come from the inside in order to generate a lasting transformation. Referring to Romania, Smaranda Enache, who is the Vice-president of 'Liga Pro Europa' organization, stressed that it is possible that "the internal stability of the country and its chances of becoming an EU and NATO member are strongly dependent on its ability to maintain interethnic harmony."31 The fact that in 1999, at the Helsinki EU summit, Romania received approval to start negotiations for integration into the European Union is encouraging, but at the same time is a warning that efforts should be intensified toward the consolidation of the unstable Romanian democracy. Romanian national interest lies in NATO and EU integration and being active in national politics in Romania today means working toward this integration. As it has been pointed out "â?¦in our days, the national interest is tied to European and trans-Atlantic openness not nationalist extremism."32 Whoever is against integration by promoting another political agenda, is working against the civic national interest, against the sort of nationalism that is not based on ethnicity but on the common goal of achieving a more just, more secure and more affluent society. Therefore, as long as the national image of the state will be considered more important than the social and economic well-being of the society, the mistreatment of the ethnic minorities will not cease.

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